example, thinks of empathic caring as the touchstone of virtuous agency and its moral significance grounded in sentiments of admiration or approval we naturally feel towards manifestations of empathic caring. 7 The connection between virtue and well-being here is indirect: a caring world is a world in which things generally go well for us, but, on Slote's story, this isn't why empathic care is morally significant to us. Slote's sentimentalist approach differs markedly from that of philosophers, such as Hursthouse and McKinnon, who ground the moral significance of virtue directly in what it takes for a human life to go well. Nonetheless, agent-based and agent-prior accounts share a key feature. They attempt to ground all moral judgment in judgments of virtue and virtuous agency that do not themselves make use of non-aretaic moral notions. I address them both in this discussion of agent-based theories of right action.
Agent-based accounts of virtuous action identify the morally significant features of an action in terms the qualities of agency it expresses or reflects. These might include motives for the act, dispositions underlying the act or to its motive, and capacities, including epistemic capacities, that are exercised in deciding how to act. What these accounts can't be made to rely upon is adventitious features of the act or its circumstances. Being successful in one's intention is not a quality of agency but a fact about outcomes. Even if we think that a key aspect of virtue is reliability -so that possession of a virtue, say, is made to depend upon an agent's capacity to reliably succeed in ends internal to the virtue -this does not entail the virtuous agent's success on any particular occasion. Even highly reliable agents can fail in their goals if circumstances turn against them. This means that accounts of virtuous agency that build in an explicit success condition are not agent-based theories. Linda Zagzebski is a prominent defender of this kind of account of virtuous agency, which means that her's is not an agent-based ethics. (Q) If it is morally right for S to φ, then there are possible deliberations that, were S to undertake them, would conclusively recommend to S that they φ. These deliberations must be:
(i) accurate (i.e. pick out those features of S's φ-ing that make it right), and
(ii) morally permissible.
I intend to use this principle to argue against various agent-based equations of virtuous agency and right action. The idea underlying Q(i) is that a right action is right in virtue of properties of the act and its circumstances; properties that can, in principle, be identified and employed in moral deliberation. Consider the example of spontaneously coming to the aid of an injured person encountered on a lonely stretch of road. If it is right to come to the person's aid, then there must be some features of the person's predicament, of the moral agent's predicament, or of the action of coming to person's aid that make it right.
In principle, an account of these right-making features should be available either to Moral failure, and along with it the idea of fair moral blame, are intentional notions. They need not apply to extensionally equivalent action-descriptions. This is one reason why Kant's identification of the good will with an agent's acting for duty, rather than acting in conformity with duty, has such intuitive force. 14 If I am right that moral failure is an intentional notion, then agents ought not be morally judged on grounds they are required to ignore in moral deliberation. In the example where I misapply the moral rules specified Other moral theories may also find reason to discourage agents from habitually deliberating over the right-making features of their actions, but generally they must do so on different grounds. For example, a deontologist may consider the right-making property of an action to be those features that make it fall under an appropriate rule.
Thinking about one's actions in this way will not itself violate the rule. The exception would be rules against explicit moral deliberation per se, but these tend not to figure in deontological specifications of right action. Still, there may be a rule to the effect that it is wrong to automatically refer to rules when making decisions. A rule of this kind would allow that explicit moral deliberation is always permissible, but ought not be allowed to become an invariable habit. things that really matter in the circumstances at hand. While it is true that a concern for the external standard of one's behavior factors in the needs of others indirectly -since one can only meet standards of care by attempting to satisfying some of these needs -the focus of the deliberation is all wrong from an agent-based virtue ethicist's point of view.
This kind of moral deliberation is not the kind that a hypothetical fully virtuous agent would engage in. Thus explicit deliberation in terms of P 2 does not meet standards of virtuous deliberation, and so P 2 fails to satisfy Q. The case against P 3 follows similar
lines. An agent deliberating in terms of P 3 would be seeking to act so as to deserve a virtuous agent's approval. To deliberate about which of a set of potential actions would best deserve the approval of a fully virtuous agent, would not itself generally deserve the approval of a virtuous agent. Thus P 3 also fails to satisfy Q.
AGENT-BASING THE HAZZARDS
Let me illustrate the argument against agent-basing with a fictional case, the story of the Hazzards. The Hazzards are a devout family living in 17 th century New England. Alma and Quincy come to believe that their thirteen year old son, Jack, is possessed by a devil because he is given to fits of shaking and foaming, refuses to attend bible-readings and has been heard using foul language within earshot of his parents. Being caring and conscientious parents, fully convinced of the reality of satanic possession and the peril of their son's soul, Alma and Quincy spend long hours discussing their best course of action. They consult their spiritual advisor and other leaders within their spiritual community, who recommend exorcism. At the exorcism, the boy is uncooperative and so must be tied to the bed. After long hours of prayer and physical and mental chastisement it seems clear to them that the devil will not out and has reached only deeper into the boy's soul. Jack's behaviour worsens alarmingly as the exorcism reaches its climax.
Alma and Quincy interpret this as a spiritual crisis and pray for enlightenment. It comes in the form of an angel, who appears to Quincy in a dream and tells him that Jack is not after all possessed of a devil. Instead, the angel tells Quincy, Jack is one of the holy fallen: his spirit is too fragile to survive below the heavenly sphere and the boy must return to his origin before he is lost forever. Quincy and Alma are distraught at the news, but the angel was adamant that Jack's case is a matter of the greatest urgency. Yet Quincy's visitation might have been merely a dream, perhaps it was bedevilment, so Alma and Quincy take the wise step of postponing any decision, settling on a course of further prayer, reflection & consultation.
The following night, however, the angel visits Alma, repeating the message he delivered to Quincy the night before. And on the following three nights both Alma and Quincy receive in their dreams what appear to be identical visitations from the angel, all repeating the same message and emphasizing the urgency of matters. It becomes harder and harder for Alma and Quincy to reasonably resist concluding that God's word has been sent them and that it demands immediate action. They seek a further consultation with their spiritual advisor, who although initially very sceptical of the angel's theologically strange -seemingly heretical -warning, is eventually convinced that something a great spiritual significance is occurring among the Hazzards. The night of the Hazzards' visit, the advisor also has a dream in which an angel appears to him, telling him that he must prepare the Hazzards for a terrible sacrifice, and the next day he tells Alma and Quincy of the angels' visitation to him. All three pray together and search out the voice of their conscience. Many exhausting hours of prayer and reflection eventually bring resolution to Quincy and Alma. They come to a conclusion to abide by the angel's word: to do otherwise would be to hide behind the self-deceptions of doubt, fear and selfishness. To care for Jack -the most precious part of him -requires that they take his life. It would be deeply wrong to let selfish, earthly love stand in the way of their caring for his soul. Quincy and Alma move to save Jack's soul -and so they take his life. To get around this stalemate, I suggest we look to Alma and Quincy's moral deliberations more closely. Let me consider the broad kinds of moral deliberation available to Alma and Quincy. From the story, it seems that they reasoned as follows: (1) We ought to do the best we can for Jack.
(2) The best we can do for Jack is kill him.
Thus we ought to kill him.
This appears to be a virtuous kind of deliberation because it expresses real care for Jack, which is the relevant virtue here, and because it involves, arguably, an admirably determined and sincere pursuit of the truth and a measure of practical wisdom. 12 Moral particularists might wish to dispute this claim. However, the agent-based virtue ethicist I am discussing offers a more or less explicit account of the right-making features of actions, namely the aretaic qualities that underlie the agent's acting. 13 There may be circumstances in which accurate moral deliberation is obligatory as well as permissible, but these would be special circumstances. In general, I think it is enough to insist that accurate moral deliberation ought to be at least permissible.
14 Kant Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 4: 398.
15 Williams (1981, 17-18) . 16 Williams presentation of the objection contrasts the impartial demands of morality with partial and agent-relative commitments which he thinks of as essentially non-moral yet constitutive of a person's allegiance to life itself, including moral aspects of life (1981, 18 ). Williams held the very task of articulating a theory of rightness to be misconceived.
However, the 'one thought too many' objection to Kantian moral theory has an application beyond Williams's anti-theory stance.
17 Michael Slote calls this effect a doubling back to the world. He writes that "one's inward gaze effectively "doubles back" on the world and allows one … to take facts about the world into account in one's attempt to determine what is morally acceptable or best to do" (2001, 39 (2001, 41) . 19 The case may be different with self-regarding virtues like integrity, but even in the case of integrity it is not at all clear that a person manifests integrity by explicitly directing their deliberative concern at their own integrity.
20 See Railton (1984) for an example of such a theory. 21 The nearest theory in the vicinity appears to take the form of a theory that defines right action in terms of properties such that, were moral agents to act deliberately to bring them about, they would be acting virtuously. An action would then be right if and only if it instantiates these properties or causes their instantiation. Plausible versions of such a theory -versions that involve essentially other-directed virtues -would not be agentbased theories, because the properties agents seek to instantiate when they act virtuously would not be an aretaic properties of themselves.
